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THE UNCERTAIN NATURE OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
MARTHA

A. FIELD*

One of the first things we teach entering law students is the importance of clarity in rules governing courts' jurisdiction. One reason for jurisdictional rules to be clear and simple is that litigating
at length over the proper forum in which to litigate is a poor use of
limited judicial resources, expensive to the parties and to the public. It would be better, if a case is filed in an appropriate forum, for
it to be able to proceed to the issues on the merits rather. than
spend time game-playing with jurisdictional doctrines.
Another reason simplicity is desirable in jurisdictional rules is
that jurisdictional objections can be raised for the first time quite
late in the proceedings. True, the general rule that a judgment can
be collaterally attacked for want of jurisdiction even after it is, for
most purposes, final has little significance for federal jurisdictional
issues.1 But another facet of the same principle is that jurisdictional issues can be raised on appeal, by any party or by the court
on its own motion, even when the issues have not been mentioned
at trial or at any earlier appeal. It is not infrequent in federal jurisdictional decisions for an issue to arise for the first time before the
United States Supreme Court, and for that issue to be considered
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. B.A., Radcliffe College; J.D., University of
Chicago.
1. Federal jurisdictional issues generally, at least if debatable, do not provide a basis for
collateral attack. See Des Momes Navigation & R.R. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U.S. 552
(1887); M'Cormick v. Sullivant, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 192 (1825). Even in the state jurisdictional context, the general rule allowing collateral attack admits of many exceptions. For
example, if the issue is the existence of in personam jurisdiction, persons who were participants in the prior judgment are bound by any ruling if they litigated the jurisdictional question, Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's As'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931); otherwise they are
often deemed to have waived jurisdictional objections, see Mrowczynskl v. Mrowczynski, 142
N.J. Super. 312, 361 A.2d 554, 557 (App. Div. 1976); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 19
(1942); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 33 (1971). When the issue is subject
matter jurisdiction, litigated questions, if at all debatable, become res judicata, e.g., Durfee
v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); American Sur. Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932); if issues
that were not raised are at all debatable, parties to previous litigation may be precluded
from collateral attack, e.g., Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Chicot County Drainage
Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938).
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on its merits and to be dispositive, rendering meaningless all the
litigation on the merits that has occurred in the lower courts.2 Jurisdictional requirements that are simple to spot, as well as easy to
apply, thus seem a definite advantage.
Nonetheless, the more one studies federal jurisdiction, the more
forcefully one must conclude that much uncertainty surrounds the
decision of many federal jurisdictional issues. In many cases, some
of which I will describe in detail later, federal jurisdictional rules
are extraordinarily unclear. They are also extremely complex. And
it is not obvious what policy the complexities fulfill.
I believe that one reason for the confusion in federal jurisdictional rules is that we have little sense of what we are trying to
achieve when we bestow or withhold federal jurisdiction. To some
extent this is inevitable. The general purposes oft recited for the
establishment of federal courts and the extension or contraction of
their jurisdiction-federal judges' greater proficiency in federal law
and greater sympathy toward federal claims, state judges' comparative proficiency on state law issues and their possible bias in favor
of local litigants, and comparative docket pressures of state and
federal courts, for example-differ in the various regions of the
country and vary in importance according to the facts of the particular case, the legal issues raised, and the particular judge one
happens to draw. Nonetheless, there is a peculiar schizophrenia in
the case discussions of the policies favoring state or federal forums.
When, in federal constitutional litigation, for example, a court
wishes to support the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it speaks of
the importance of federal tribunals as the primary guardians of
federal rights. Thus, in England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners8 the Supreme Court said:
There are fundamental objections to any conclusion that a liti2. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Department of the Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149
(1908); cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (eleventh amendment bar to jurisdiction
raised for the first time in the court of appeals); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433
(1971) (Supreme Court refused abstention request, although implicitly acknowledging such
a claim could be first raised before that court); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144
(1963) (Supreme Court recognized that a failure to empanel a three-judge court when statutorily required would result in a reversal and remand, even if not previously requested).
3. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
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gant who has properly invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider federal constitutional claims can be compelled, without his consent and through no fault of his own, to
accept instead a state court's determination of those claims.
Such a result would be at war with the unqualified terms in
which Congress, pursuant to constitutional authorization, has
conferred specific categories of jurisdiction upon the federal
courts, and with the principle that "When a Federal Court is
properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction
The right of a
party plaintiff to choose a Federal court where there is a choice
cannot be properly demed." Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co.,
212 U.S. 19, 40. Nor does anything in the abstention doctrine
require or support such a result. . . Its recognition of the role
of state courts as the final expositors of state law implies no disregard for the primacy of the federal judiciary in deciding questions of federal law..
[Supreme Court review of state court decisions on federal
claims,] even when available by appeal rather than only by discretionary writ of certiorari, is an inadequate substitute for the
initial District Court determination
to which the litigant is
entitled in the federal courts. This is true as to issues of law; it
is especially true as to issues of fact. Limiting the litigant to review here would deny him the benefit of a federal trial court's
role in constructing a record and making fact findings. How the
facts are found will often .dictate the decision of federal
claims.
. Thus . . a litigant may not be unwillingly de-4
prived of [a primary fact determination by the district court].
Other cases in which the Supreme Court has stressed the importance of original federal jurisdiction in enforcing federal constitutional rights include Steffel v. Thompson,5 Mitchum v. Foster,6
Zwickler v. Koota,7 Monroe v. Pape,8 and Ex parte Young.9
There is, however, an equally long, equally well respected list of
cases maintaining the contradictory position: state courts have the

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 415-17
415 U.S. 452
407 U.S. 225
389 U.S. 241
365 U.S. 167
209 U.S. 123

(footnotes omitted).
(1974).
(1972).
(1967).
(1961).
(1908).
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same responsibility toward federal claims that federal courts have
and state courts cannot be presumed to do a less competent job.
The rhetoric of this position reads as follows: "It is generally to be
assumed that state courts and prosecutors will observe constitutional limitations as expounded by this Court"; 10 "state courts
have the solemn responsibility, equally with the federal courts 'to
guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the
11
Constitution of the United States
The assumption upon which the argument proceeds is that federal rights will not be adequately protected in the state courts,
and the "gap" complained of is impatience with the appellate
process if state courts go wrong. But during more than half of
our history Congress, in establishing the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts, in the main relied on the adequacy of the state
judicial system to enforce federal rights, subject to review by
this Court.
Misapplication of this Court's opinions is not confined to the
state courts, nor are delays in litigation peculiar to them. 12
This line of cases is available for support in cases when the state
forum is to prevail. When both lines of decision are read, we sinply do not know whether federal courts are "the primary and powerful reliances for vindicating" federal rights"$ or whether that proposition improperly belittles state judges and disregards their
responsibilities under the supremacy clause. We do not know
which of these sets of propositions is appropriate to consider in
interpreting the contours of particular jurisdictional statutes or
judge-made jurisdictional doctrines.
This underlying uncertainty in our policies concerning federal
jurisdiction has counterparts in our more specific rules concerning
jurisdictional requirements. Federal jurisdictional rules are unclear
in different ways. In some areas we simply cannot tell what the
jurisdictional rules are. In other instances the rule is well estab10. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
ii. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974) (quoting Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S.
624, 637 (1884)).
12. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richmond Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 518-19 (1955);
accord, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976).
13. F FRANKFURTER & J. LANDis, THE BusinEss OF THE SUPREME COURT 65 (1928).
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lished, but its terms are so elastic that the result they yield on any
given set of facts is not predictable. Finally, there are areas with
rules and counterrules ready to be applied or aptly ignored, according to which disposition is desired. The examples I discuss below reflect all these situations.

I.
A.

FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION

Tests for Jurtsdiction

It is not possible to define with accuracy the tests for federal
question jurisdiction. The federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1331, provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States."1 The critical issue is the meaning of "arising under." It is clear that the meaning differs from that of the
same words in the constitutional grant of judicial power in section
2 of article III-"The judicial Power shall extend to all cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority" 1 5-for "arising under" there is broad indeed. e If
statutory jurisdiction were as broad, almost every case would be a
federal question case; the burden on the federal courts would be
overwhelming.
There is no consensus concerning the meaning of "arising under"
in the statute. Mr. Justice Holmes announced the classic definition
in 1916 when he said, "A suit arises under the law that creates the
cause of action. 17 As I will discuss shortly, even that rule provides
little certainty because of the great flexibility that exists in deter14. Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Acts of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94
Stat. 2369 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
16. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (federal question jurisdiction exists, in constitutional sense, whenever any federal proposition forms an
"original ingredient" of the cause, whether or not the federal proposition is at issue);
Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. Rav. 157, 160-63
(1953) (defending the different interpretations of similar language in constitutional and
statutory contexts). But see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (treating Osborn and other decisions on the scope of the
constitutional "arising under" as though they were interchangeable with statutory
precedents).
17. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
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mining whether a federal cause of action exists.1 s But even more
basic, it is a matter of dispute whether Holmes' requirement is prerequisite to federal question jurisdiction, as he believed, or whether
it is one of two or more alternative paths to federal question jurisdiction. If the latter, there is little agreement as to what the other
tests may be. In fact, there is almost no discussion of the problem
in the cases.
Judge Friendly, in T.B. Harms v. Eliscu,19 did address the issue
and concluded that "Mr. Justice Holmes' formula is more useful
for inclusion than for the exclusion for which it was intended."20
As a supplemental test, Judge Friendly suggests "a case may 'arise
under' a law of the United States if the complaint discloses a need
for determining the meaning or application of such a law.

21

The

cases he cites to support the existence of the test-a test he also
describes as "appropriate pleading of a pivotal question of federal
law" 22-do not however, support its existence. In one of the two
cases he uses to support the test, DeSylva v. Ballentine,23 the parties did not question federal jurisdiction nor did the Supreme
Court mention the issue. True, it was probably because the case so
obviously turned on interpretation of a federal statute that all concerned overlooked the jurisdictional problem,24 but DeSylva hardly
announces an important new basis for federal question jurisdiction.
The other case Friendly relied on, Smith v. Kansas City Title &
Trust,25 is murky indeed. It can be read to fit into Judge Friendly's
test, but other interpretations are also possible.
Although Judge Friendly's formulation seems more innovative
than he admits, it haA been included by the American Law Institute [ALI] in its description of the current tests for federal question jurisdiction in the Institute's Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, 2 a study that in turn is
18. See notes 31-38 & accompanying text infra.
19. 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964).
20. Id. at 827.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
24. Compare Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59
(1978), discussed in text accompanying notes 39-51 znfra.
25. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
26. ALI STUDY OF THE DrvisION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
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often cited. Accordingly, Friendly's addition may become part of
the accepted test. It appears a functional addition; cases turning
on federal law seem appropriate for federal courts. It is not clear
whether it would allow many of them in, however, since Friendly
seems to adhere to the Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley 27 ruling as well. Mottley holds that in deciding whether fed-

eral question jurisdiction exists, a court looks only to the wellpleaded portions of the complaint; anticipation of defenses cannot
confer jurisdiction.28 Adhering to this rule, it will be the rare case
indeed where one can know from the complaint that the federal
question is pivotal. Well-pleaded declaratoryjudgment complaints
might disclose a pivotal federal question, but declaratory judgments are not recognized as legitimate forms of action for purposes
of applying the well-pleaded complaint rule. Instead, Skelly Oil
Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. 29 held that, in a declaratory judg-

ment action, one must look to the form of action that would have
been brought if declaratory relief were not available and judge the
existence of federal question jurisdiction under that old form of
action.
Incidentally, the existence of the Mottley well-pleaded complaint rule, and the fact that it is generally deemed to be of some
significance, convinces me that Holmes' cause of action test cannot
be the exclusive test of federal question jurisdiction. My reasoning
is that the cause of action under which a suit is brought is always
properly part of the complaint; accordingly, if the cause of action
had to be federal, the well-pleaded complaint rule would be superfluous. There must be additional categories of federal question jurisdiction for the Mottley test to have significance. That test does
not, however, tell us what the additional categories are. I would
welcome general adoption of Friendly's pivotal federal question
test, coupled with an overturning of Skelly Oil so that declaratory
judgment complaints that appropriately disclose an important federal controversy can confer federal question jurisdiction. That rule
is not the law today, however.
484-85 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY].
27. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
28. Id. at 152.
29. 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
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Enough has been said to show it is difficult to know what the
tests for federal question jurisdiction are, although federal question is one of the most important headings of federal courts' jurisdiction and although the issue has been with us for many years
with little perceptible development. No resolution or attempt at
resolution seems to be on the horizon. The ALI in its 1969 study of
jurisdiction noticed the problem but ultimately decided not to
enunciate a standard for federal question jurisdiction in its proposed statute; it was afraid of creating confusion if it brought any
rationale to the area:
The existing doctrines as to when a case raises a federal question are neither analytical nor entirely logical, but a considerable
body of case law has been built up on this subject that is reasonably well understood by courts and litigants and that works well
in practice. It has therefore seemed the safer course to follow the
traditional language, with only minor change, and thus to make
it clear that the subsection preserves that body of law.30
B. Implied Causes of Action
At least we know that there is federal question jurisdiction in
cases where there is a federal cause of action. 31 Even this part of
the test, however, is less clear than it seems. The problem is determining whether a federal cause of action (usually meaning remedy32) exists. Federal statutes and constitutional provisions often
are not explicit in this regard; they may establish a right without
specifying the remedy for its violation, whether it is to be created
as a matter of federal law, or whether state remedies should be
relied upon. The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution is an example; Mapp v. Ohio3 s and Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents" are two of the cases that struggled with questions
of remedy when the wording of the amendment itself provided lit30. ALI STUDY, supra note 26, at 179.
31. But see Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933); Shoshone Mining Co. v.
Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900); Roecker v. United States, 379 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1005 (1967).

32. In the cases cited in note 31, supra, there were express federal remedies yet no federal
jurisdiction was found.
33. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
34. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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tle guidance. Even if the statute or constitutional provision in
question does provide a federal remedy, it often will not specify
whether that remedy is to be exclusive; or whether it is to be supplemented by other federal remedies which federal courts are to
devise; or whether it is to be supplemented by state remedies.3 5
The answers to these questions are generally unknowable until
courts tell them to us. Courts are to decide the issues weighing all
the circumstances and bearing in mind what fits best with congressional intent, in the case of a statute,3 6 or with constitutional mtent, if a remedy for a constitutional violation is at issue.3 7 Once a
particular statute or constitutional provision is held to embody or
not embody a particular federal remedy, we have guidance for the
future, but not until then.ss

C.

The Duke Power Case

The renowned Duke Power v. Carolina Enironmental Study
Group 9 provides one final illustration that the complications of
35. In T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), for example, it was not
obvious from reading the Copyright Act, under which Harms sued, that his action for adjudication of ownership of a copyright did not state a federal cause of action. It had long been
held, however, that infringement was the only federal cause of action "arising under" the
Copyright Act (together with certain specifically granted remedies such as a suit for statutory royalties for record production). Id. at 828.
36. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
37. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
38. A recent decision respecting the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) suggests that enactment provides a federal cause of action for violations of all federal statutes in suits against
persons acting under color of state law. Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S.Ct. 2502 (1980). It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will carry through with the implications of the
Thiboutot opinion, which did not discuss directly the Court decisions concerning implication of causes of action from federal enactments. See First Nat'l Bank v. Marquette Nat'l
Bank, 636 F.2d 195, 198 (8th Cir. 1980) (arguing that Thiboutot did not extend § 1983
protection for statutes that did not concern "important personal rights akin to fundamental
rights"). It was already established that § 1983 provides a federal right of action for violation of all federal constitutional provisions by persons acting under color of state law, see
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (but query whether that ruling should
apply to actions under the contract clause, see Spears v. Mount Etna Morris, 313 F. Supp.
52 (W.D. Mo. 1969)). Moreover, the same result may possibly obtain in all constitutional
suits against federal officials or persons acting under color of federal law. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
39. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). Duke Power is known principally for its justiciability holdings.
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detecting whether federal question jurisdiction exists are virtually
boundless. Chief Justice Burger there added yet another twist to
the complexities of federal question jurisdiction by joining together
the uncertainties of federal remedial law and the doctrine of Bell v.
Hood.40 Bell v. Hood developed the doctrine that federal question
jurisdiction does not exist if the claimed federal question is insubstantial. The Court in Bell v. Hood held that federal question jurisdiction is lacking only if the federal question claim is "wholly insubstantial and frivolous. 41 If it is simply wrong, the court should
dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, but jurisdiction exists,
with the possibility of pendent state claims.42 The practice of finding implied causes of action and the Bell v. Hood doctrine together
enabled the Chief Justice to find jurisdiction in a case in which its
43
absence had gone undetected prior to Supreme Court review.
In Duke Power, the Chief Justice said that federal question jurisdiction would exist if it was arguable that a federal cause of action could be implied, whether or not the Court actually ruled
there was a federal cause of action.41 He then discovered an arguably implied remedy-a cause of action against the regulatory
agency flowing from the due process clause. 4'5 He proceeded
thereby to sustain jurisdiction under Bell v. Hood, holding it was
unnecessary to decide whether a federal cause of action actually
existed. 4'6 The Chief Justice went on to uphold on the merits the
constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act,4' with its limitation on
liability for nuclear accidents. 8

40. 327 U.S. 678 (1946). The Court m Bell held that federal question jurisdiction can be
defeated only if the asserted federal question claim is "wholly insubstantial and frivolous."
Id. at 682-83. A decision that a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted is a decision on the merits; however, federal court jurisdiction still exists, with the
possibility of a judgment on pendent state claims. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715 (1966).
41. Id. at 682-83.
42. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
43. The Court had earlier employed a similar technique in Mt. Healthy City School Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 277-79 (1977). See also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,
475-76 & n.5 (1979).
44. 438 U.S. at 70-71.
45. Id. at 69 & n.13.
46. Id. at 70-72.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976).
48. 438 U.S. at 84-94.
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This approach to federal question jurisdiction is expansive indeed. It is almost always arguable that there is a federal cause of
action. 49 Indeed, in Duke Power the Chief Justice was the first to
articulate this argument. Justice Rehnquist wrote a less imaginative but more convincing concurring opinion in which he explained
why federal jurisdiction did not in fact exist.
For many years the Supreme Court decided no cases raising important questions about federal question jurisdiction. The Court
decided Duke Power by applying a combination of the old tests,
but it created no new categories of federal question jurisdiction,
and it did not take the opportunity to clarify the law in the area.
One might maintain, with the ALI, that it is best to leave well
enough alone and let judges and litigants continue to work within
this reasonably well understood, although ultimately incoherent,
system. Seeking more consistent rules might simply add another
level of intellectualization to an area already abounding in that
characteristic.
I do not agree with the ALI position, however. Federal question
jurisdiction strikes me as an area that can be rationalized and one
in which relatively predictable rules can be developed that will
lead to sensible results. Duke Power in some ways was a perfect
case for answering some of the basic federal question issues that
have been with us for years; it was a case that so clearly turned on
federal law that no one bothered to question jurisdiction over it,
but in which, under conventional tests, jurisdiction did not exist. 0
Duke Power presented an opportunity to announce that federal
question jurisdiction exists if a well-pleaded complaint, including a
declaratory judgment complaint, shows that the controversy turns
on federal law.
If, however, one opts for the ALI approach, 51 it would seem pref49. Id. at 95. Duke Power also showed an extraordinary eagerness to reach the merits,
and thereby sustain the constitutionality of the challenged statute, in its standing/ripeness
ruling. Justices Stevens and Stewart wrote separate objections to this aspect of the Court's
opinion. Id. at 94 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 102 (Stewart, J., concurring).
50. The plaintiffs claimed that the limitations of the Price-Anderson Act unconstitutionally limited recovery rights in the event of a nuclear accident.
51. While the ALI declined to draft the jurisdictional statute in analytic terms, its approach differs less from mine if one takes into account its commentary. The commentary
explicitly endorses the notion that federal question jurisdiction should exist when "the complaint discloses a need for determining the meaning or application of federal law," ALI
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erable to make the jurisdictional determination openly discretionary than to act as though it is governed by a mass of rules that
purport to fit into a coherent system. One advantage to making
discretion explicit is that you thereby inform litigants, and lower
court judges, to talk about the factors that are relevant and not to
take too seriously the distinctions now discussed. Another advantage of starting to discuss the real variables is that such discussion,
over time, can help to develop factors that lead to more appropriate, predictable, and uniform results.
II. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
Federal question is not the only basic jurisdictional area where
the rules are unclear, although perhaps the uncertainties are most
pervasive there. In diversity jurisdiction as well I will discuss a basic question that has long existed with little helpful development
from the courts. While it is hard to understand or justify the Supreme Court's failure to resolve this issue, diversity jurisdiction
generally is unlike federal question jurisdiction in that many of its
basic issues are clear and easy to apply.
For a long tine confusion has reigned over definitions of corporate citizenship for diversity purposes. Corporations' ability to manipulate their citizenship, and thereby to create or defeat federal
jurisdiction to obtain the desired forum, is one of the abuses that
led to Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.52 Since that time Congress has
cut down on the problem of foreign reincorporation in order to
manufacture diversity jurisdiction. In 1958 it enacted 28 U.S.C. §
1332(c), making a corporation "a citizen of any State by which it
has been incorporated" as well as "of the State where it has its
supra note 26, at 178, or, phrased otherwise, when "an important question of federal
law is an essential element m the case." Id. at 179. But by declining to put any definitive
resolution of the problem in the statute, it preserves the ambiguity that has long been with
US.
Other parts of its statutory resolutions effectively bring its proposals closer to my own. It
retains the well-pleaded complaint rule, but for these purposes it treats complaints seeking
declaratory relief the same as those seeking coercive relief. Id. at 24-25, 171-72 (proposed 28
U.S.C. § 1311). Moreover, by proposing to change current law to permit removal generally
on the basis of a federal defense, &d.at 25 (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1312(a)(2)), the ALI provides a federal forum for cases wlch do in fact turn on federal law.
52. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
STUDY,
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principal place of business.""
The chief uncertainty now lies m the effects of multiple mcorpo-

ration. It seems settled that a corporation has only one principal
place of business." It is not clear, however, whether under the
other clause of section 1332, making a corporation "a citizen of any

State by which it has been incorporated," the corporation can have
multiple citizenship. The language certainly seems to suggest it
should be a citizen of every state in which it is incorporated, and
that approach would best serve the policy of reducing the number
of diversity cases. 55 But some courts, even after the 1958 revision
of section 1332,8 have said a corporation is a citizen only of the
forum state5" (and of one principal place of business), for diversity
purposes. For example, assume a corporation incorporated in Illinois and Michigan with a principal place of business in California.
That corporation could sue or be sued by a person from Illinois in
Michigan federal court, under the diversity jurisdiction, but not in
Illinois federal court under this rule; by contrast, the corporation
would be considered a co-citizen with the person from Illinois
under the citizen-of-all-places-of-incorporation rule regardless of
the forum where suit was brought.
This issue-the effect of multiple incorporation on diversity ju-

53. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)
(1976)).
54. See Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1960). There is difficulty,
of course, in determining what the principal place of business is and what test should be
applied to determine this when, for example, there is more than one place of operations or
when a corporation's production and its management are located in different states.
55. Moreover, a corporation is not likely to be the subject of discrimination in a state in
which it is incorporated, and accordingly the policies behind diversity jurisdiction would not
seem to require federal jurisdiction here.
56. Prior to the revision another possibility was that a multi-state corporation was diverse
to everyone. See Nashua & L.R.R. v. Boston, L.R.R., 136 U.S. 356 (1890); Gavin v. Hudson
& M.R.R., 185 F.2d 104 (1950). Other early possibilities were that a corporation was a citizen of its first place of incorporation, St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, 560-65
(1896), or of all places except those in which it was forced to incorporate as a condition of
doing business, zd.
57. Hudak v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 238 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Majewski v. New York Cent. R.R., 227 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mich. 1964); see Jaconski v. McCloskey & Co., 167 F. Supp. 537, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (holding that under the 1958 revision one
could not use the Hudak "diverse to all" theory when the corporation is incorporated in one
state with a principal place of business in another). See also Chicago & N. Ry. v. Whitton's
Akdm'r, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 283-84 (1872) (formulating the "forum" doctrine).
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risdiction-has been with us actively since the mid-nineteenth century Before the century was out, the Supreme Court announced a
host of plainly inconsistent rules,5" including all the possibilities
that are with us today, with no attempt to reconcile them. The
Court has done little to clarify the situation since, although summary affirmance in Jacobsen v. New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad,s9 when the cases it cites are read, does seem to reject as a
possibility that a multistate corporation is diverse to everyone. I
believe that Congress should be taken to have cleared up the question in enacting section 1332(c) and to have adopted the rule that
a multistate corporation is diverse to no person from any state in
which it is incorporated, but that has not transpired.
III.

PULLMAN ABSTENTION DOCTRINE

°

As noted earlier, the implication of causes of action is an area in
which the procedure to follow is fairly clear-that is, divine congressional or constitutional intent from all the circumstances-but
where the test itself is sufficiently indefinite that the results of its
application are not predictable. 61 Nonetheless, precedents form
over tine. Once the federal courts have decided what remedies are
available under a given statutory or constitutional scheme, we have
a much more developed body of law than if we always had to reason from a generalized congressional or constitutional intent.2
58. St. Louis & S.F Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, 560-65 (1896); Nashua & L.R.R. v. Boston
& L.R.R., 136 U.S. 356 (1890); Chicago & N. Ry. Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
270, 283-84 (1872); Ohio & M.R.R. v. Wheeler, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 286, 297-98 (1862).
59. 347 U.S. 909 (1954).
60. There are other kinds of abstention as well, one of which is discussed in the next
section. See notes 61-81 & accompanying text infra. The administrative abstention developed in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), also deserves mention, however. This is
an area in which federal courts defer to state courts for decision of federal issues as well as
state issues, so that no return to federal court is possible. Yet the requirements for Burford
abstention are utterly uncertain. There is no requirement of unclear state law or of a federal
constitutional issue, and the abstention has something to do with the involvement of a state
administrative agency. But abstention is certanly not available for every regulatory case.
For an attempt to describe requirements for Burford abstention, and to discover a rationale
behind it, see the section on administrative abstention in Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctnne, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071,
1153-63 (1974).
61. See notes 31-38 & accompanying text supra.
62. See, e.g., T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964) (treatment of the
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The Pullman3 abstention doctrine is like the implication of federal causes of action in that we know what the Pullman test is, but
its terms are sufficiently flexible that knowledge of the test does
not lead to predictable results. Unlike the law of federal causes of
action, however, one cannot expect helpful precedents in the abstention area to develop over tune.
The rule of Pullman absention is that federal courts will defer to
state courts m cases containing unclear issues of state law whose
resolution could avoid or substantially modify a federal constitutional question." When the federal court abstains under the doctrine, the federal litigants are sent to state court to present their
state law issues. While they can reserve federal issues for a return
to federal court, 5 before returning they must pursue state issues
from the state trial court all the way up to the state supreme court,
if that tribunal is available to them.66
While the Pullman rule is clear, its application m any given fact
situation is highly uncertain. The chief ambiguity in the rule lies in
the requirement that state law be "unclear." But almost any rule
of law is somewhat unclear, so most federal constitutional litigation against states arguably can come within the rule. Moreover,
even if the rule spelled out the degree of unclarity required for
abstention, how much uncertainty there is in interpreting any particular state enactment is a matter difficult to measure or explain,
a matter where individual judgments may differ sharply.
This is an area, then, where uncertainties in application of an
articulated test mean that results will differ greatly according to
the particular tribunal. From the litigants' point of view the issue
can be of great moment. If it is important to them to preserve their
right to a federal forum for determination of federal issues, an abstention order means they may have to undergo the delay and expense of two trials rather than one-first in state court and then, if
the constitutional issue remains, before the federal court. Moreover, the expense and delay may be increased if the abstention orremedies available under the Copyright Act). For a discussion of T.B. Harms, see note 35
supra.
63. Railroad Conm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
64. Id. at 501.
65. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964):
66. See, e.g., Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 229 (1957).
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der is made late in the federal proceedings-or even by the court
of appeals or the Supreme Court. The case law affords many examples of the delay abstention can cause. England v. Louisina State
Board of Medical Examiners,67 for example, was decided on the
merits only after nine years of litigation; a final decision came five
years after absention was ordered. The decision in Spector Motor
Service, Inc. v. O'Connor""was rendered nine years after the action
began and seven years after the Supreme Court first ordered abstention. 69 In Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States,70 abstention
prevented the case from ever being decided. Eleven years after the
litigation began and eight years after abstention was ordered, it
71
was dismissed as moot.

I would resolve the problems of abstention by holding that the
costs of the Pullman doctrine outweigh its benefits and that it
should no longer be followed. In cases requiring abstention, one
could still obtain answers to disputed state issues by use of state
certification procedures. Even if that were done, however, the
problem of identifying the standard for abstention/certification
would remain. And it may be that "unclear state law" is a standard
72
we cannot effectively narrow in order to guide judges' discretion.
If we cannot effectively narrow the abstention standard, and if, unlike federal common law, review of abstention decisions will not
yield meaningful precedents, then I think we should cut down the
reviewability of decisions relating to abstention. 3
Another question that should certainly be faced in any major rethinking of federal question jurisdictional practices is whether we
ought to retain the practice of letting jurisdictional rules be raised
for the first time after trial. Where we do not succeed in simplifying jurisdictional rules, cutting back on the practice of allowing
them to be raised at any time would cut down some of the enor67. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
68. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
69. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944).
70. 352 U.S. 220 (1957).
71. United States v. Leiter Minerals, Inc., 381 U.S. 413 (1965).
72. The current definition is so broad as to provide little guidance and predictability. The
fear is that a narrowed definition would wrongly omit cases in which abstention or certification is appropriate.
73. I think we should restrict review at least if abstention is involved and not the much
more economical certification procedure.
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mous waste which jurisdictional litigation produces today.
It should be observed that the various rules I discuss m this paper as "federal jurisdictional rules" are jurisdictional in different
senses and' to different degrees. Some strictly delimit federal
courts' power: for example, rules determining the existelice of federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction. Others, like
Pullman abstention, concern the propriety of exercising jurisdiction which undoubtedly exists. 4
There are counterparts to both kind of issues in the state system. Usually when we think of state jurisdictional issues we think
of strictly jurisdictional ones-those defining the limits of particular state courts' power to act. Most questions of in personam and
in rem jurisdiction are of this type. But forum non convenzens is a
rule concerning the exercise of state court jurisdiction that is definitely of the discretionary variety; it asks whether a particular
state court should exercise jurisdiction that it undoubtedly possesses or whether instead the greater convenience of an alternative
forum warrants deference in its favor.
Like most federal jurisdictional doctrines, and certainly the
more prudential ones, forum non convemens cannot be raised after
trial to void a decree already rendered.75 Unlike federal doctrines,
however, it also cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Indeed, the forum non conveniens doctrine is usually considered reviewable only to determine whether the trial judge abused his
discretion."
The reviewability of abstention decisions greatly exacerbates abstention's chief cost-the length of tine it takes to get a definitive
decision. For example, under current law if a trial court declines to
abstain, its decison is reviewable but not immediately;78 first the
court disposes of the case on the merits. A party whose case has
been fully adjudicated in a federal district court and in the court of
appeals therefore may face an abstention decision for the first time
74. Other rules are discretionary in this sense as well; for example, see some of the justiciability decisions cited in note 126 infra.
75. Because the defense "is not an absolute lack of jurisdiction," Wilburn v. Wilburn, 192
A.2d 797 (D.C. 1963), the decree is not void for lack of power.
76. See, e.g., Flaiz v. Moore, 359 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. 1962).
77. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S 485 (1947).
78. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
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in the Supreme Court of the United States. Indeed, under current
law that may result even if the possibility of abstention has not
previously been noted by either party, because the Court can, and
does, raise the issue on its own motion. If the Supreme Court
does decide to abstain, the parties are remanded to state court to
start the litigation anew on state issues, perhaps years after their
litigation began.80 The disposition of the federal issues that have
already been fully adjudicated is set aside. Only after the parties
work their way up through the state appellate system can they return to federal court for resolution of the federal issues.
I am not advocating that the forum non conventens model of
nonreviewability be carried over to federal jurisdictional issues
generally or even to all the discretionary/prudential ones. I believe
that the preferable alternative to nonreviewability is to develop
criteria for jurisdictional rules sufficiently definite that they can be
applied at the outset of litigation without substantial risk of error.
But in areas in which we find ourselves unable further to specify or
clarify jurisdictional criteria and in which we do not see a substantial risk of trial judges using their discretion to deviate from federal policy on a particular issue, we should strongly consider the
forum non conventens model of nonreviewability
Thus, in the abstention context I have suggested elsewhere that
decisions to abstain be reviewable, and reviewable before the state
court litigation takes place, but that decisions not to abstain be
nonreviewable. 81 This suggestion obviously involves a value judgment that we need to protect against trial judges' overuse of the
abstention doctrine to avoid cases properly within their jurisdiction; a decision to exercise jurisdiction that in any event exists cannot be such a serious mistake that it is worth the costs associated
with review. This solution of nonreviewability should not be available for jurisdictional issues which are less prudential and which go
to federal courts' power, nor should it be used in areas in which
review could contribute to developing much more definite jurisdictional rules.
Even when nonreviewability seems inappropriate, however, it is

79. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
80. See notes 68-71 & accompanying text supra.
81. See Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 590 (1977).
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not necessary to allow federal jurisdictional issues to be raised for
the first time on appeal. That certainly should not be allowed for
the more prudential federal jurisdictional decisions, as opposed to
those that go strictly to the federal courts' power to proceed. Even
if standards for jurisdiction can be made clear and definite, the
parties or the court can be expected to notice them at some point
during the trial; otherwise they should be deemed waived.
IV. Dombrowski v. Pfister, Younger v. Hams, AND

THEIR

PROGENY

A. The Younger Doctrine
Finally, I want to discuss the Dombrowski- Younger line of cases
to illustrate a different kind of uncertainty and flexibility in federal jurisdictional doctrine. In Dombrowski v. Pfister, 2 plaintiffs
sought declaratory relief and an injunction restraining state officials from prosecuting them under a statute alleged to violate the
first amendment by its overbreadth. No state prosecution was
pending when the federal action was brought.83 The Supreme
Court held that the district court should decide the case on the
merits because special circumstances justified the exercise of jurisdiction-allegations of overbreadth in the coverage of the statute
and of bad faith on the part of the state prosecutors. 8 In Younger
v. Hams,8 5 which did involve a pending prosecution, the plaintiff
sought to enjoin the district attorney from prosecuting him for violating California's Criminal Syndicalism Act.86 Despite an overbreadth allegation, the Supreme Court held the federal district
court should defer in favor of criminal prosecution in the state
court, which the Court thought an adequate forum in which to
raise the federal constitutional issue87
Dombrowski, Younger, and the cases decided under their authority have come to stand for the principle that, except in extraordinary circumstances, a federal court should not interfere by
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

380 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 484 n.2.
Id. at 490-91.
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400-11401 (West 1970).
401 U.S. at 49.
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injunction in state criminal proceedings, threatened or pending. A
federal court may not issue declaratory relief either if there are
pending state proceedings,8 8 but it may when proceedings are only
threatened, 9 although doubts have been raised whether the declaratory relief will have res judicata effect or merely persuasive
force.9 0 For these purposes, "pending" state proceedings are defined as those commenced in state court "before any proceedings
of substance on the merits" have occurred in federal court.91 A federal plaintiff therefore may win the race to the courthouse only to
discover that the attempt to sue has led the district attorney to
prosecute, thereby vitiating the federal law suit and bringing about
the criminal prosecution that was feared. There are paths around
the Younger doctrine: one may seek a preliminary injunction
against the threatened prosecution at the outset in federal court.9 2
(That avenue is available only if prosecution is simply threatened;
pending prosecutions cannot be halted through interlocutory federal relief.93 ) Another way state adjudication can sometimes be
avoided is by complying with the state law that is challenged until
"proceedings of substance on the merits" occur in federal court. In
that event, the state has nothing to prosecute for until the federal
suit is already under way, so the state is prevented from robbing
the plaintiff of a federal forum by creating a pending proceeding.

88. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
89. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
90. See td. at 470 (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 124-26 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)); id. at 476-78 (White, J., concurring); id. at 47984 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). By contrast, Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), had said
that, in the pending prosecution situation, declaratory relief was unavailable equally with
injunctive relief because "ordinarily a declaratory judgment will result in precisely the same
interference with and disruption of state proceedings that the long-standing policy limiting
injunctions was designed to avoid." Id. at 72. See also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S.
922 (1975).
91. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975). Prior to Hicks the line was drawn according to which party won the race to the courthouse. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
at 484 n.2. Justice Rehnquist, however, foreshadowed the Hicks holding in his concurring
opinion in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. at 479-84.
92. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
93. The interlocutory injunction may also be useful only in situations in which the plaintiff's challenge is to state interference with a continuing course of conduct.
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B. Authority Behind the Dombrowski-Younger Doctrine
What is the authority for the Dombrowski-Younger doctrine?
The source of its ban against injunctions is less than clear. The
Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283,9 prohibits injunctions
against state proceedings except in certain circumstances. The Act
does not apply unless state proceedings are pending when the injunction is sought,9 5 an exception which includes some of the cases
the Younger v. Harrisdoctrine affects. Moreover, section 2283 does
not apply to cases arising under section 1983,96 as this secton is an
"expressly authorized" exception.97 This exception includes all the
criminal cases in the Younger v. Harrisline, because all constitutional litigation against state officers falls within section 1983.98
Mr. Justice Black, the author of the Younger v. Harrisopinion,
there explained Younger's deference to state proceedings as deriving from the policy behind the Anti-Injunction Act, even though
the Act itself does not apply.99 Indeed, at that time it was still unclear whether the Civil Rights Acts were within the exceptions to
section 2283; Justice Black found it unnecessary to decide the issue, holding that the same result would obtain whether the Act
applied or not: the federal court would exercise jurisdiction upon a
showing of bad faith or harassment but not otherwise.200
It is strange, to say the least, that the exceptions to a statute
should be interpreted to yield exactly the same results as the statute itself and also that "the policy of the Act" can accomplish this
both for the Act and its exceptions without identification of what
94. "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in id of
its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976).
95. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965); Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 161-62 (1908).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
97. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
98. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
99. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 43-54.
100. Id. at 54; see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 229 (1972). Indeed, if the cases were
directly governed by the Anti-Injunction Act, the Dombrowskt-Younger doctrine would be
considerably narrower than it is, for the Act is limited to injunctions against pending prosecutions. Under the Act one can test the constitutionality of state enactments under any
circumstances except when the race to the courthouse has been won in state court. See
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 161-63
(1908).
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that policy is. Justice Black confessed that "the precise reasons for
this long-standing public policy against federal court interference
have never been specifically identified." 101 Black identified
two "primary sources" of the policy: first, "the basic doctrine of
equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when
the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief"; 102 and, second,
"Our Federalism," which he defined as "the notion of 'comity,'
that is a proper respect for state functions."1 0 3
This explanation does not adequately support the Younger doctrine. In the first place, it is not a long-standing doctrine, although
the Supreme Court usually talks as though it is. It stems principally from dictum in Douglas v. City of Jeannette'M to the effect
that federal injunctions against state prosecutions are unnecessary
absent a showing of irreparable harm from being left to raise federal constitutional issues in the context of the state prosecution. 10 5
It should be noted that this statement, and the DombrowskiYounger doctrine which is built upon it, invokes a total change of
presumption from the usual rule that, if a case falls within the federal jurisdiction and if a plaintiff chooses the federal rather than
the state forum, the plaintiff has a right to pursue the suit there,
absent "special circumstances" warranting the nonexercise of federal jurisdiction. 10 6 Although the Dombrowski-Younger cases fall
within federal jurisdictional grants, including the Civil Rights Acts,
the Dombrowski-Younger doctrine creates a presumption in favor
of state jurisdiction, thereby requiring the federal plaintiff to show
special circumstances, usually bad faith or harassment, in order for
federal jurisdiction to be exercised.
The Douglas v. City of Jeannette dictum, which fostered this
change of presumption from federal to state jurisdiction, was picked up as the general policy in Dombrowski v. Pfister for the pur-

101.
102.
103.
104.

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 43.
Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 44.
319 U.S. 157 (1943).

105. Id. at 163-64.
106. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472,
492 (1949).
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pose of showing that there are exceptions and that federal courts
sometimes will exercise jurisdiction. In so picking up the restrictive
Douglas statement as the general rule, the Court in Dombrowski
seemed not to realize, however, that federal jurisdiction should be
exercised as a matter of course and not as an exceptional circumstance. Cases supporting the exercise of jurisdiction as a matter of
course date back to Ex parte Young,10 7 in which the Court had

clearly articulated the need for federal jurisdiction. Young had
been followed repeatedly prior to Dombrowski, at least in cases
where the plaintiff desired to pursue
a continuing course of con10 8
duct free from state interference.
Justice Black's argument for the policy of federal noninterference suffers from an additional weakness. Traditions of equity do
not support deferring to state forums here. It is true that there is a
principle of equity disfavoring injunctions against criminal prosecutions,10 9 and that, as a result, state courts do not easily enjoin
state criminal prosecutions and federal courts do not easily enjoin
federal ones. Moreover, it is a traditional rule of equity that injunctions should not issue in the absence of irreparable harm.
Nonetheless, in our federal system, we have not measured irreparable harm for federal injunctions by asking whether state remedies
would afford adequate relief.110 It is that approach to irreparable
harm, peculiar to the Dombrowski-Younger doctrine, that creates a
presumption in favor of state jurisdiction, even in cases Congress
107. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
108. See, e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co.,
274 U.S. 445 (1927); Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
Sometimes when a federal plaintiff had sought to enjoin a state prosectuion for a single
violation of state law that had already occurred, the federal court would defer to the state
proceedings. See, e.g., Fenner v. Boykn, 271 U.S. 240 (1926). But see Wechsler, Federal

Courts, State CriminalLaw and the FirstAmendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 740, 785-88, 906
(1974) (maintaining that Fenner was one of a very few cases contrary to the general view
and that "[p]rior to Younger the Supreme Court consistently encouraged the use of lower
federal court declaratory and injunctive relief against unconstitutional state criminal laws").
See also Laycock, FederalInterference with State Prosecutions:The Need for Prospective
Relief, 1977 Sup. CT. Rsv. 193. At any rate, most of the Dombrowski- Younger cases, includ-

ing Dombrowski and Younger themselves, involve plaintiffs wishing to pursue a continuing
course
109.
110.
Wall.)

of conduct.
See, e.g., In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1880).
See, e.g., McConihay v. Wright, 121 U.S. 201 (1887); Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7
425 (1869).
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has placed in the federal courts, and makes federal courts available
only when state courts are inadequate on the facts of the particular
case. This judge-created presumption against the exercise of federal jurisdiction flies in the face of our usual notions of Congress'
ability to regulate federal courts' jurisdiction by setting forth circumstances in which the parties, or one of them, may have access
to the federal courts. In other contexts, the Court has recognized a
"duty," imposed by Congress' jurisdictional statutes, to "give due
respect to a suitor's choice of a federal forum for the hearing and
decision of his federal constitutional claims."' Accordingly, the
Court has applied the irreparable harm requirement and the rule
that no injunction shall issue if there is an adequate remedy at law
by asking only whether available remedies on the law side of the
federal court afford the plaintiff sufficient protection; it has not
looked to available state remedies just because concurrent federal
jurisdiction exists. 1 2
C. Methods of Avoiding the Younger Doctnne
The Younger doctrine is far reaching in its scope. The paradigm
case for its application (and the only context in which the doctrine
has any historical support 1 ") is the case in which a federal plaintiff
who has engaged in a one-time violation of state law seeks to enjoin the state prosecution. As the doctrine is applied today, however, it carries over to other situations, so that the policy against
federal court interference with state criminal proceedings becomes,
in effect, a policy against federal adjudication of the constitutionality of state criminal enactments generally. Consider, for example, a
person who has violated a state criminal statute by engaging in
conduct she/he wishes to continue and who comes to federal court
to challenge the constitutionality of the state statute. The federal
court could follow the practice of allowing relief against future
prosecutions although not against prosecutions for conduct that
ill. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967).
112. Moreover, the alternative of a state prosecution may not provide an adequate forum
for hearing the federal plaintiff's claims, so the irreparable harm requirement may be satisfied on that basis. Professor Laycock makes a convincing case that the state prosecution is
usually inadequate to protect the needs of the federal plaintiff, especially the plaintiff anxious to continue the conduct that the state wishes to punish. Laycock, supra note 108.
113. See note 108 supra.
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has already occurred. At one time such a differentiation between
present and future prosecutions was accepted, and the anti-injunction ban had much less bite. 1 14 Today, courts instead take the posi-

tion that passing on the validity of the state criminal enactment,
even as it relates to future prosecutions, would affect the current
prosecution as well, and that the adjudication therefore cannot be
allowed.

11 5

The principal way for litigants today to avoid being forced to
resort to state court remedies is to comply with the questionable
state law before challenging it in federal court. The Younger bar
does not affect the availability of these previolation suits as a
means for securing federal adjudication of the constitutionality of
state criminal enactments.
Plaintiffs often have trouble, however, in establishing the justiciability of these anticipatory actions. In Younger v. Harrs, for
example, a prosecution for violating the state's criminal syndicalism statute was pending against Harris, but three other plaintiffs
who had not violated the law joined in the suit. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, ordered the case dismissed as to the
three nonviolating plaintiffs because "persons having no fears of
state prosecution except those that are imaginary or speculative,
are not to be accepted as appropriate plaintiffs

. .,,11

He did

suggest that a different result might have obtained if their allegations had differed: "if these three had alleged that they would be
prosecuted for the conduct they planned to engage in, and if the
District Court had found this allegation to be true-either on the
admission of the State's district attorney or on any other evidence-then a genuine controversy might be said to exist."' 17 Allegations designed to show the immediacy and concreteness of a
grievance, however, are often dismissed in this fashion after the
fact as insufficiently specific, even when plaintiffs have done all
that seemed necessary beforehand to establish the justiciability of
114. See, e.g., Cline v. Fnnk Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927).
115. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125-27 (1973) (that controversy was nonetheless
decided m federal court because of the existence of other plaintiffs not subject to present
prosecutions). But see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 710-12 (1977).
116. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 42.
117. Id.
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their claim.11
Many of the cases most used to illustrate that anticipatory
(previolation) lawsuits still provide an effective means for challenging in federal court the constitutionality of a state criminal enactment are, in fact, not true anticipatory actions. Steffel v. Thompson,11 9 for example, in some ways was an anticipatory action
because Steffel was not threatened with prosecution for past infractions. Twice he had been threatened with arrest if he declined
to stop handbilling, and both tnes he had stopped. His companion the second time, however, had refused to stop, and he had been
arrested and arraigned. The plaintiff alleged that he wanted to
continue handbiling, and the parties stipulated that if he did continue he might be arrested and charged.12 0 Even here, the district
court dismissed the complaint on the grounds, among others, that
"the rudiments of an active controversy between the parties . .
[are] lacking, 12 1 but the Supreme Court held the controversy was
justiciable.
Steffel v. Thompson does not, however, demonstrate that plaintiffs will have a federal forum available to them if only they proceed correctly It was only because the police, in their discretion,
had declined to prosecute Steffel for past offenses that Steffel was
able to avoid being ousted from federal court. Otherwise, even after winning the race to the courthouse, his case could have been
removed by the state beginning to prosecute him in their courts
"before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken
place in federal court." If the state so chose to act, "the principles
of Younger v Harris [would] . . . apply in full force. 1 22 Steffel
therefore could not be guaranteed access to a federal forum if he
had violated the statute and not been prosecuted. If he had violated the statute and had been prosecuted, Younger would prevent
federal courts from hearing his claim while the state proceedings
were pending, and when they were through, res judicata would pre-

118. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103
(1969).
119. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
120. Id. at 453-54.
121. Becker v. Thompson, 334 F Supp. 1386, 1389-90 (1971), afl'd, 459 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.
1972), rev'd sub nom. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
122. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975).
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vent him from litigating his claim in federal court. 2 '
Only if Steffel never had violated the statute could he have
avoided the Younger doctrine; in so helping his Younger problem,
however, he would have hurt (although not necessarily fatally destroyed) his justiciability case. The fact that Steffel had actually
violated the statute in the past and had been threatened with arrest showed his interest in handbilling, and the risks that it posed
for him, much more convincingly than if he had never violated the
law.1 24 Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in Steffel, agreed that it

was an exceptional case, saying that cases in which a nonviolator
could show "'a genuine threat of enforcement of a1 disputed
state
25
rare.
exceedingly
be
[would]
.
.
statute'.
criminal
This is not to say, of course, that the truly anticipatory action, in
which no violation of state law has occurred prior to federal litigation, will never succeed. It can. 2 6 But the criteria for justiciability

123. Until recently it might have been an open question whether res judicata could preclude a litigant from federal court m a § 1983 action, see, e.g., Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426
(1975); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Note, The PreclusiveEffect of State
Judgmentslon Subsequent 1983 Actions, 78 COLUM. L. R.v. 610 (1978); Developments in
the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HJAv. L. REV. 1133, 1330 (1977), or whether
instead § 1983 actions would follow the federal habeas corpus model m which res judicata is
no bar, see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). But recently the Supreme Court has
strongly indicated that normal principles of res judicata will apply in § 1983 actions. Allen v.
McCurry, 101 S.Ct. 411 (1980) (formally discussing only relitigation of fourth amendment
claims).
124. See Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1976).
125. 415 U.S. at 476 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting the majority opinion).
126. Challenges to an enactment brought before violation are sometimes justiciable. See,
e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452, 458-60 (1974); Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 507-10 (1972); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252-55 (1967); cf. Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (federal law); Hynes
v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 621 (1976) (state court appeal); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393, 398-403 (1975) (not crinmal law); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167 (1967)
(federal law); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (appeal from state court); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (not directly subject to law). Just as often, however, they are not. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 81
(1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1971); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103
(1969); cf. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (federal law);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (not criminal law); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 158 (1967) (federal law); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (state court appeal);
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 86-91 (1947) (federal law). Like many federal jurisdictional doctrines, the criteria that separate the cases finding ripeness and standing from those finding it wanting are anything but consistent or clear. Indeed the jus-
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are sufficiently elastic that it is ultimately unpredictable whether a
case like Steffel's, brought by a person whose associates had violated the enactment but who himself had not done so, will withstand a nonjusticiability challenge. There are devices that sophisticated civil liberties litigants may use to create a concrete and
adverse dispute without violating state law. One practice, I am
told, is to write to the local district attorney's office threatening
violation, with the hope of receiving back a threat to prosecute if
the violation occurs. But the fact remains that the justiciability criteria are so indefinite that a person wishmg to challenge the constitutionality of a state criminal enactment cannot be confident of
access to a federal forum by the anticipatory action, and Younger
can exclude the litigant from federal court when a violation of
state law predates the federal proceeding.
A remaining possibility for obtaining federal jurisdiction in a
nonanticipatory situation is for the federal plaintiff, while the state
proceeding is threatened or pending against him, 127 to file a damage action in federal court against state officers, a municipality, or
any other proper defendant, charging a violation of her/his constitutional rights in connection with the violation of state law. The
theory of the damage action would obviously differ according to
the facts and the particular constitutional challenge made, but
Steffel, for example, were he threatened with prosecution for violating the anti-handbilling statute, could sue the threatening police
officers for interfering with his first amendment rights. Problems
exist if the aim is to prevail on the merits of this litigation. Most
noticeably, the officers will not be liable in damages if they acted
in good faith and with probable cause. 128 The aim, however, would

ticiability area is one generally recognized as encompassing

discretionary judgments

concerning the wisdom of hearing particular cases and as not applying consistent tests. See,
e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 519 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); A. BIcicKL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) (lauding this flexible application by the courts).
127. Res judicata and collateral estoppel could operate once the state proceeding was
completed. Allen v. McCurry, 101 S. Ct. 411 (1980).

128. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 551 n.5. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
District attorney immunity from damages can be even greater. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409 (1976). The problem is lessened if a plaintiff can sue a municipality or county for a

constitutional violation that represents its official policy. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Counties and cities are not entitled to a good faith defense.
See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). States, however, are protected from
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be to have the federal court, in the course of the adjudication, pass
on the constitutionality of the handbilling statute-a ruling the
district judge might conceivably avoid by saying that in any event
the defendants would not be liable because no evidence of bad
faith exists. Even if the judge did pass on the statute and held it
unconstitutional, that alone would not necessarily bar any state
9
prosecution.

12

While the Supreme Court has passed on the Younger doctrine's
applicability to declaratory judgment proceedings as well as injunctive ones,130 it has not passed on its applicability to damage
actions. There are reasons to hold Younger inapplicable. The paradigm Younger example concerns noninterference by injunction
with state criminal proceedings. The purpose of damage actions
typically differs from that of injunctive relief more than does the
purpose of declaratory relief. Moreover, damage actions are less
likely to raise the problem that has troubled the Court in the declaratory relief coitext: declaratory relief may have, and is
designed to have, the same effect as an injunction, although there
is no contempt sanction for its violation. 113 A damage award, however, would carry consequences apart from its declaration concerning the state law's validity. Nonetheless, lower federal courts have
these suits by federal sovereign immunity law. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
129. It would provide the plaintiff with a federal adjudication to use as persuasive authority in defending a state action, and one that could possibly become binding on the state as
precedent after court of appeals and/or Supreme Court review, unless the absence of bad
faith, and hence of liability, persuaded the federal appellate courts to refuse to rule on the
statute's constitutionality. Moreover, after the federal proceeding was final, if circumstances
were such that the issue were entitled to res judicata/collateral estoppel treatment, its decision might support an injunction against continuation of state proceedings under the relitigation exception to § 2283.
130. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
131. A declaratory judgment, however, may support an injunction when a state officer
disregards the declaratory judgment; in that event the plaintiff in the declaratory action
may be able to return to federal court and obtain an injunction on the strength of the earlier
declaratory relief proceeding. The only alternative to thus allowing declaratory relief to
bring about an injunction is to deprive the declaratory judgment of res judicata effect and
thereby to make it merely advisory. See generally Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-73
(1974); id. at 476-78 (White, J., concurring); id. at 482-84 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). While
it is conceivable that an adjudication of unconstitutionality in a damage action might simlarly support an injunction, see note 129 supra, an adjudication in a damage action is much
less likely to have that effect because the parties and issues are more likely to differ from
those in an injunctive proceeding, and res judicata/collateral estoppel is less likely to apply.
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on occasion applied Younger to damage actions,"3 2 and a general
extension of Younger to this area is not inconceivable.
While it is not clear exactly how to assess the scope of these various possible routes around the Younger doctrine, it is clear that
plaintiffs' access to federal courts to test the constitutionality of
state criminal enactments has been severely obstructed by the
combination of the Younger doctrine with notions of justiciability.
Moreover, the Supreme Court does not seem troubled by the notion that there may be no avenue to federal court for persons wishIng to challenge the constitutionality of state enactments. Last December, in Allen v. McCurry,"" the Court characterized the lower
court's decision as stating "a generally framed principle that every
person asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered
opportunity to litigate that right in a federal district court, regardless of the legal posture in which the federal claim arises."'
Rejecting the principle, the Court said:
The authority for this principle is difficult to discern.
It cannot lie in the Constitution.
And no such authority is
to be found in 1983 itself.
The only other conceivable basis for finding a universal right
to litigate a federal claim in a federal district court is hardly a
legal basis at all, but rather a general distrust of the capacity of
the state5 courts to render correct decisions on constitutional
issues.

1

Yet the Court itself had recognized, earlier in the decision, that
"one strong motive behind
enactment [of the Civil Rights
Acts] was grave congressional concern that the state courts had
been deficient in protecting federal rights," 13 6 and a strong case
can be made that an important purpose of the Civil Rights Acts
was to allow federal courts to serve as the primary tribunals for

132. See Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 1976); Guerro v. Mulheam, 498 F.2d
1249, 1252-53 (1st Cir. 1974). See also Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1976), af'd
per curiam, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
133. 101 S. Ct. 411 (1980).
134. Id. at 419.
135. Id. at 419-20.
136. Id. at 417.
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hearing constitutional complaints relating to state laws. 137 As the
Court said in Mitchum v. Foster,
[The] legislative history [of the Civil Rights Act of 1871] makes
evident that Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the
relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to
the protection of federally created rights; it was concerned that
state instrumentalities could not protect those rights; it realized
that state officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those rights; and it believed that these failings extended
to the state courts.
Section 1983 was thus a product of a vast transformation from
the concepts of federalism that had prevailed in the late 18th
century when the anti-injunction statute was enacted. The very
purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between
the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal
rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action under
color of state law, "whether that action be executive, legislative,
or judicial." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S., at 346. In carrying out
that purpose, Congress plainly authorized the federal courts to
issue injunctions in § 1983 actions, by expressly authorizing a
"suit in equity" as one of the means of redress. And this Court
long ago recognized that federal injunctive relief against a state
court proceeding can in some circumstances be essential to prevent great, immediate, and irreparable loss of a person's constitutional rights. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123.13
Surely to exclude from federal courts tests of the constitutionality
of state criminal enactments, as the Younger doctrine manages to
do to a great extent, 39 vitiates this purpose behind the Civil
Rights Acts.
D.

The Extension of Younger to Civil Proceedings
So far I have described the Younger doctrine's protection

137. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
138. 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
139. Indeed, m Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), the Chief Justice stated the
proposition that "a [federal] court will not enjoin the enforcement of a criminal statute"
without the presence of "exceptional circumstances." Id. at 711-12 (quoting Spielman Motor
Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95 (1935)).
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against federal interference with state criminal proceedings and its
implementation to prevent most constitutional challenges to state
criminal enactments from ever being heard in federal court. Originally, Younger was thought to be limited to the criminal area, and
what one can glean of a rationale for the doctrine pertains to criminal proceedings. More recently, however, the Supreme Court has
applied the doctrine to quasi-criminal state enforcement proceedings: an action to remove a public nuisance by closing a movie the14
atre that showed obscene films,140 a civil contempt proceeding, '
an action by the state to recover fraudulently obtained welfare
benefits,'142 and an action to place allegedly battered children in
temporary custody. 143 In Moore v. Sims,144 the Court summed up
these holdings, saying Younger "is also fully applicable to civil proceedings in which important state interests are involved. ' 145 In several of the cases, the Court reserved for another day the question
whether Younger applies to civil litigation generally Justices Bren46
nan and Marshall called that reservation "tongue in cheek,'
however, pointing out that in the contempt proceeding involving
enforcement of a default judgment in a bill-collection case "the underlying suits in the New York courts
were collection suits
typically involving small loans
between purely private parties."' 147 Similarly, they observed that in the welfare case a private
party could have been plaintiff as well as the state, and the state's
"fortuitous presence" should not affect the result.148 Moreover,
several lower courts have applied the doctrine to civil cases

generally 149
A primary reason for not extending Younger to civil proceedings
140. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
141. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
142. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
143. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 423.
146. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 345 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 344.
148. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 455 (1977).
149. See Louisville Area Interfaith Comm. v. Nottingham Liquors, Ltd., 542 F.2d 652 (6th
Cir. 1976); Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769, 775 n.5 (4th Cir. 1973); Cousins v. Wigoda, 463
F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1972). But see Marshall v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 558 F.2d 680, 684 (2d
Cir. 1977) (rejecting the applicability of Younger in a civil action to which the state was not
a party).
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is that the central theory behind the doctrine relates to the undesirability of enjoining criminal prosecutions. When one steps over
the line from criminal to civil, as I shall demonstrate, the doctrine
becomes potentially boundless, swallowing not only much of our
Civil Rights Acts but also much of other federal jurisdictional provisions. Other reasons as well argue against an extension to civil
proceedings. Mr. Justice Brennan has argued that functional differences between state civil and criminal proceedings call for different treatment; safeguards are provided against initiating unfair
criminal proceedings, but civil proceedings may be started "merely
upon the filing of a complaint, whether or not well founded." 150
Moreover, a state criminal defendant often1 51 can return to federal
district court under habeas corpus; a civil defendant, however,
loses altogether his opportunity for litigation of his constitutional
issues in federal district court." 2 Finally, policy reasons for noninterference are less convincing for civil than for criminal- proceedings, which have traditionally been left more exclusively to the
states; Congress has not allowed criminal prosecutions to be removed from state to federal court except in very limited circumstances,15 3 while state civil proceedings are much more readily
removable."5
If the Supreme Court insists on extending Younger to civil proceedings, the extension should remain limited to state civil proceedings that are like criminal proceedings and, at any rate, should
be limited to civil enforcement proceedings to which the state is a
party. So limited, the intrusion upon the civil rights jurisdiction is
150. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 615 (1975).
151. The same Court that has extended Younger v. Harris to civil litigation has also cut
back on the availability of federal habeas corpus for state criminal defendants. See Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1979); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Francis v. Henderson,
425 U.S. 536 (1976).
152. When the Supreme Court first applied Younger in a civil context in Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 606 (1975), it suggested that district court consideration might
be available after the state proceeding was complete. The Court has held very recently,
however, that res judicata is a bar in § 1983 proceedings. Allen v. McCurry, 101 S. Ct. 411
(1980).
153. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1976) (federal officers sued or prosecuted); &d.§ 1442(a) (members of armed forces sued or prosecuted); id. § 1443 (civil rights cases).
154. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976). But see Shelly v. Pennsylvania, 451 F Supp. 899 (M.D.
Pa. 1978) (removal by a defendant is proper only where the federal court has jurisdiction of
plaintiff's original cause of action and not where only a federal defense is raised).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:683

obviously greater than the description above covering only criminal
enactments. Nonetheless, the Younger doctrine still does not entirely displace sections 1983 and 1343. Indeed, it would not even if
the doctrine contained no exceptions but instead removed all challenges to state enactments from federal jurisdiction. The Civil
Rights Acts would still support federal challenges to state officials'
actions, or even state statutes, if there is no corresponding proceeding that could be brought in a state court against the challenger Thus, a section 1983 action would support a federal challenge to prison guards' interference with a prisoner's mail, for it is
difficult to see what proceeding could be brought against the prisoner in that scenario. Although many federal section 1983 actions
do remain possible even under the broadest Younger reading, the
doctrine nonetheless has removed from the federal courts a large
category of challenges to state enactments that undoubtedly were
considered an important aspect of the civil rights jurisdiction. Indeed, it was hostility to certain state enactments, the Black Codes,
and a lack of trust in state courts' willingness to follow federal pronouncements concerning them, that led to the original Civil Rights
Acts and the conferral of federal jurisdiction to challenge state
laws.
Supreme Court decisions to date are consistent with limiting the
Younger doctrine to deference to state enforcement proceedings,
criminal or civil. The possibility some have detected of extending
Younger to civil proceedings generally 55 raises further and very serious problems.
In the past, under the Younger doctrine the federal courts have
deferred to state enforcement proceedings as the alternative to the
federal district court. They have not looked to state declaratory
judgment or injunctive proceedings to see whether being left to
pursue these remedies, instead of proceeding in the federal district
court, will amount to irreparable harm. Because the Younger doctrine, by definition, concerns deference to pending state criminal
proceedings, state injunctive and declaratory proceedings have not
been considered an alternative to invoking federal jurisdiction.
Presumably that should change if the federal courts were deferring
to civil proceedings generally.
155. See note 149 & accompanying text supra.
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If federal courts were to look at state injunctive and declaratory
relief as alternatives to federal court adjudication, and were to ask
whether they provided an adequate remedy, a tremendous expansion of the Younger doctrine would take place. Those proceedings
are almost always available on the state side when they are on the
federal side. In fact, the chief "exceptional circumstance" Younger
allows to justify federal relief today-harassment and bad
faith-shows the need for injunctive or declaratory relief more
than it shows the need for a federal forum. Accordingly, a rule that
required the federal court to exercise its jurisdiction only when
state declaratory or injunctive relief was inadequate, and that indulged in the presumption that state judges are as competent as
federal judges at applying the Federal Constitution, would almost
always defer in favor of state court adjudication. As a result, constitutional challenges to state enactments would be heard almost
entirely in state courts.
Indeed, at this point one would wonder why federal courts do
not defer when constitutional challenges are brought against a
state officer for her/his conduct,156 as well as against state enactments. I do not mean to imply that courts are very likely thus to
extend Younger I do not believe such a development is likely, because it would convert the Younger doctrine into a general preference for the state forum over the federal forum under all statutes
conferring federal jurisdiction. Surely courts will halt before reaching that position. I am simply suggesting that there may be no logical stopping place for the Younger doctrine if it is to expand beyond deference to state enforcement proceedings and is to include
civil cases generally. 57 On the other hand, even this result might
156. An example is the complaint against the prison guard for wrongfully denying mail to
a prisoner.
157. There has been some suggestion that this possibility of deferring to civil proceedings
generally under the Younger doctrine is fanciful because, even if the doctrine were stated as
equally applicable to civil proceedings as to criminal, few civil proceedings could be included
other than state enforcement proceedings. The reason given is that only rarely would proceedings between purely private parties be challenged under § 1983. See 17 WRIGHT, MILLER
& COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4254 nn.17-19 (1978 & Supp. 1980). The
assumption is that only § 1983 cases can fall within the Younger doctrine. The reasoning
seems to be that only § 1983 proceedings are excepted from the Anti-Injunction Act by

Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
I do not think it makes sense to hold that only § 1983 cases can fall within the Younger
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be narrowed by an argument that the whole rationale behind the
doctrine has been deference to state proceedings against the federal plaintiff and did not extend to situations in which the federal
plaintiff would have to bring an action in state court to provide an
alternate forum.158
E. DiscretinaryNature of Younger
There are several ways in which this sweeping doctrine demonstrates the discretionary nature of federal jurisdiction. First, the
creation of the doctrine shows the flexibility courts exercise; the
courts have created it although it has no authority behind it-no
statutory authority and no identifiable legitimate policy. It is a
doctrine that lacks any rationale that survives analysis. In its
broad sweep it undermines and contradicts other categories of jurisdiction that, in other contexts, the Supreme Court accepts with
enthusiasm. Because the reasoning behind the doctrine is never
made clear, its capacity to overturn other principles of jurisdiction
seems almost unlimited. Thus in Rizzo v. Goode,1 59 the Supreme
Court used Younger and the "principle of federalism" it espoused
to bar injunctive relief against state executive officers-Philadeldoctrine. The problem with that position is that it makes the exercise of federal jurisdiction
more difficult in § 1983 cases than in any others, plainly contrary to the purposes of the
Civil Rights Acts and to many Supreme Court statements on this subject. To make the
exercise of federal jurisdiction more difficult m civil rights actions because they are excepted
from § 2283's anti-injunction ban is surely to stand Mitchum v. Fosteron its head. Indeed,
it is also peculiar that the exception to the Anti-Injunction Act should apply the Act's policies more stringently than the Act itself, as the Younger doctrine does when it prohibits
federal courts from proceeding in situations where the federal plaintiff has won the race to
the courthouse. This is particularly strange anti-injunction policy for cases within the civil
rights statutes. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. at 242-43. But that merely demonstrates once
again that the Younger doctrine does not fit with Mitchum v. Foster and with the purposes
of the Civil Rights Act.
158. Courts could follow this argument without limiting deference to state enforcement
proceedings. They might believe it is legitimate for the federal courts to decline to interfere
with someone-the state or a private party-who wants to bring an action against the federal plaintiff, and at the same time believe that they should not require the federal plaintiff
to be plaintiff in state court. They might think that requiring the initiation of a state suit
would smack more of depriving the plaintiff of the right to choose a federal forum than
requiring her/hum to submit as defendant to state suits brought aganst her/him. Under this
rationale courts could sometimes defer to state declaratory or injunctive proceedings, but
only when they were initiated by the federal defendant.
159. 423 U.S. 362, 379-80 (1976).
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phia officials charged with responsibility for discrhnminatory police
practices-even though no state judicial proceedings were
involved.1 6 0
The discretion and flexibility arise, second, because the only apparent exceptions to the Younger doctrine rest on discretion. Certainly, the articulated exceptions to the doctrine. "bad faith. harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for
equitable relief," are not closely defined.1 61 And as we have seen,
the apparent ways around the doctrine rest on the federal court's
discretion. One may bring a federal proceeding before violating the
state's law in hopes that the case will be found justiciable. One
inclined to undertake risks may violate the enactment to be challenged, win the race to the courthouse in filing a federal suit, seek
declaratory and interlocutory relief, and hope that the federal
judge, in his discretion, will grant the interlocutory relief and
thereby stave off state prosecution.
Finally, the Younger doctrine is likely to serve as a discretionary
tool of federal courts because it is unlikely they will apply the doctrine uniformly to exclude cases from federal court in the way the
doctrine's contours suggest. Federal courts could begin to accept
cases simply by expanding the list of exceptional circumstances
sufficient to justify the exercise of jurisdiction under Younger It is
likely they will keep some cases as well simply by making no mention of the doctrine or by distinguishing cases in an untenable
fashion. To date there are few cases illustrating this tendency, but
Hicks v. Miranda 2 is of relatively recent vintage. Until that 1977
case it was not apparent that federal courts were closed to most
section 1983 suits challenging state crininal enactments; instead, it
seemed that federal jurisdiction, at least to grant declaratory relief,
would turn upon whether the state or federal proceeding was first
filed.
Wooley v. Maynard 63 does illustrate the Supreme Court's tendency sometimes to back off, without adequate explanation, from
applying Younger and related rules that taken literally might to-

160.
161.
162.
163.

See also
Younger
422 U.S.
430 U.S.

O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971).
332 (1975).
705 (1977).
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gether eliminate from federal court almost all challenges to state
enactments brought by plaintiffs who had violated state law. The
federal plaintiff in Wooley had been subjected to a series of prosecutions for covering up on his New Hampshire license plate the
state slogan, "Live Free or Die." In the federal proceeding he
sought to enjoin future prosecutions. Chief Justice Burger, writing
for the majority, found "exceptional circumstances" justifying an
injunction against future state prosecutions:
We have [the necessary exceptional circumstances and the clear
need for an injunction] here for, as we have noted, three successive prosecutions were undertaken against Mr. Maynard m the
span of five weeks. This is quite different from a claim for federal equitable relief when a prosecution is threatened for the
first time. The threat of repeated prosecutions in the future
against both him and his wife, and the effect of such a continuing threat on their ability to perform the ordinary tasks of daily
life which require an automobile is sufficient to justify injunctive
relief.1 "
The case was not technically within the Younger doctrine because
there was no pending state prosecution; three state prosecutions
had been completed. But the Chief Justice did not explain why
issues decided in that series of state prosecutions were not res judicata for the federal decision concerning the constitutionality of
New Hampshire's requirement that the slogan on the license plate
be displayed. This case seems to illustrate that, when the Supreme
Court is sympathetic to the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it can
and does simply ignore the procedural barrier that lies in the way.
I do not believe that the Court will be willing to be as restrictive
across the board in allowing federal relief as the cases decided
since the 1977 Hicks v. Miranda decision suggest.
In sum, as a result of Younger and its progeny, there is a large
category of civil rights cases where today federal jurisdiction will
be exercised only by the grace of the particular federal judge.
Within this class of cases, federal jurisdiction for constitutional
challenges is not a right, and the expectation is that it will not be
allowed.

164. Id. at 712.
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CONCLUSION

I have described only a few of many possible examples of the
overcomplexity and resultant uncertainty and flexibility in the application of jurisdictional doctrines in federal courts. Other examples of basic problems with jurisdictional doctrines abound, doctrines whose growth seems to have been abandoned when they
were still in an undeveloped, unrationalized, and uncertain state. L6 5
In talking of the uncertainty and flexibility in federal jurisdictional
areas, I do not mean to overstate the case. There are open questions in all areas, and indeed it would not be advantageous to have
all questions definitively settled. The law grows by trying different
solutions and formulating answers one step at a time. There are
areas where extreme uncertainty exists-congressional control over
federal courts' jurisdiction, for example-but where the lack of a
definitive answer is due more to the paucity of litigation than to
any irresponsibility on the part of courts in developing the law.
Sovereign immunity is another area in which rules and counterrules make it utterly impossible to predict in advance the result in
any particular case. The Supreme Court, for example, maintains
both that sovereign immunity protects states from federal suit
without their consent and that Congress, acting in any area where
it has regulatory power, can subject the states to suit, although the
two propositions seem inconsistent. 66 The uncertainty here, however, may reflect a doctrine in flui-a court in the process of developing a solution but uncertain for the moment in which direction
the law is to turn.
Areas like federal question jurisdiction are somewhat different
because the uncertain issues, as well as being very basic, have been
with us for a very long time. While there are not large numbers of

165. For one example, it is not at all clear how to ascertain whether a case turns on a
federal issue for purposes of Supreme Court review of state court decisions. See Department
of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U.S. 425, 427 (1973); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966);
Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S.
551 (1940).
166. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973); Parden v. Terminal
Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964). See generally Field, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: CongressionalImposition of Suit
Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1203, 1212-40 (1978).
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cases raising the issues, they do come up with regularity. The failure to develop the basic jurisdictional principles seems difficult to
justify in these circumstances. 8e In some areas of uncertainty, like
the citizenship of corporations for diversity purposes, possible alternative solutions have been fully developed; all that is needed is
for the Supreme Court to make a choice between existing alternatives, thereby resolving the ambiguity it has perceived in Congress'
enactments on the subject. And in areas where more clarification is
not possible, we could import more certainty into jurisdictional decisions made in particular cases by cutting down on the review-and certainly on the late raising-of issues concerning the
exercise of jurisdiction.
Simplification of much jurisdictional doctrine would result from
generally espousing the position that, where Congress has given
concurrent jurisdiction, the federal courts should respect the parties' choice of forum.""8 This formulation would throw into question the legitimacy of the Pullman abstention doctrine in general
or at least would reserve it for only the most extraordinary of
cases. Of course, a rule would have to be developed as well for the
situation when the parties both brought suit, but in different forums. I would suggest that the forum in which suit was first
brought should proceed with the suit, except perhaps in the most
extraordinary circumstances. State and federal courts then would
avoid the duplicative, costly, and essentially unseemly race for a
judgment with res judicata effect in the other forum. Instead a
race-to-the-courthouse approach may best show respect for both
state and federal forums as legitimate adjudicators of constitutional doctrine. It would reflect both the state interest in continuing with criminal or other enforcement proceedings unimpeded

167. The uncertainty m areas like federal common law is more understandable. While the
current limits of federal judicial power to formulate common law are lughly elusive, the
problem is one that has been perceived fairly recently. The cases convey the sense that,
although the ultimate course is not yet clear, alternative solutions are being tried and considered. See, e.g., Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977); United States v. Little Lake
Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 480 (1973).
168. One can argue that courts cannot respect both litigants' interests; one party or one
forum must be preferred. But surely Congress has made those choices in its jurisdictional
statutes, currently giving plaintiffs the choice subject to limited removal from state to federal court by defendants, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1343, 1441 (1976 & Supp. HI 1979),
and the courts need not concern themselves with the wisdom of those choices.
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and the federal interest in staying open as an important forum for
adjudicating the constitutionality of state enactments, and it
would adjust those interests in the least costly fashion. Until Hicks
v. Miranda that solution of the Younger problem was a possibility,
creating a workable compromise between the state and federal
spheres by allowing a federal plaintiff who sued before being prosecuted to go forward, at least with declaratory relief,"6 9 while allowing state prosecutions commenced before federal suit to progress unimpeded. That possible solution disappeared with Hicks,
and the current result instead seems to be that litigants cannot
obtain federal jurisdiction, at least not as a matter of right, whenever their section 1983 challenge relates to some proceeding that
can be brought against them m state court.
Our failure to simplify federal jurisdictional rules has allowed
them to become essentially a bag of tricks, traps for the unwary,
and huge hurdles even for the most wary litigants. The complexities and fine distinctions direct parties away from discussing, and
courts from formulating, what are and should be the real factors
affecting state-federal jurisdiction.
It is worth taking a moment to muse about why these rules are
tolerated by decisionmakers, who in other contexts are quite conscious of efficient use of judicial resources? Why is this area one
with so many conflicting precedents and underdeveloped
doctrines?
A primary cause that comes to mind is the small number of
cases raising these jurisdictional issues. There are areas of great
theoretical importance, such as the basic requirements for federal
question jurisdiction, where the same issues come up repeatedly
over the years, but the overall number of cases raising the issues is
small. One reason the litigants do not raise the issues more often
is, of course, because they are so complex and costly to litigate.
Another reason the courts have not done better at rationalizing
the basics of the doctrines is simply that the doctrines are procedural rules and they arise in cases in conjunction with substantive
rules which are generally of more interest to the judges involved.
Particularly at the Supreme Court level, rationalizing procedure is
rarely a priority. The Court chooses most of its cases, and the pro-

169. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
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cedural issues in a case are usually accompanied by substantive issues which have moved the Court to agree to hear the case. The
procedural issues are seen largely in terms of how they will affect
the substantive ones. Thus particular judges' positions on procedural rules change easily according to the effect they have on the
merits of the case. 17 0
By the same token the flexibility the jurisdictional rules provide
in their undeveloped state can prove useful to judges, allowing
them to dispose of difficult cases without having directly to discuss
the moral, social, or political value judgments behind those dispositions. Some of the results judges have reached by following this
approach seem, however, singularly inappropriate. For example,
many of our discretionary doctrines allowing nonexercise of jurisdiction in cases falling within congressional grants apply primarily,
or even exclusively, in civil liberties cases. It is hard to see why this
group of cases should be deemed less deserving of jurisdiction
than, shall we say, diversity cases. The Civil Rights Acts provided
that federal courts should be a forum for constitutional challenges
to state enactments and practices, and if ever there is a likelihood
of bias on the part of state tribunals, many of whom are subject to
election, that probability seems greatest when a party challenges
the constitutionality of state enactments.
Perhaps one reason these rules have nonetheless developed here
is that many difficult cases are involved, so it is an area in which
courts look for escape devices. Moreover restrictive jurisdictional
practices may substitute for a value judgment that if articulated
171
would reflect hostility to civil liberties cases on the merits.

170. Justice Brennan said as much in his dissent to Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975),
when he wrote, "[T]he opinion [of the Court], which tosses out of court almost every conceivable kind of plamtiff who could be injured by the activity claimed to be unconstitutional, can be explained only by an indefensible hostility to the claim on the merits." Id. at
520. Compare, for example, the abstention position of Chief Justice Burger in Lake Carriers
Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 513 (1972) (joining in the dissent of Justice Powell), with
his abstention position in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Compare also his standing position in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26 (1976) (joining the majority opinion authored by Justice Powell), with his standmg position in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978)
(writing for the majority).
171. It has sometimes been suggested as a way of cutting back the "excesses of the Warren era" that federal courts simply became unavailable to redress claims there developed. It
is my position that if such a value judgment is made, it would be better to reject unwanted
decisions on the merits, thus addressing the real variables at stake. But see A. BiciKL, supra
note 126.

